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Currently, our Army does a good job at developing tactical and operational leaders, as evidenced by our success at those levels in Iraq and Afghanistan, but numerous studies conducted by the Army and by leading think tanks highlight the need for greater attention to strategic leader development. Requiring an advanced degree from an accredited university and completion of true broadening assignments will facilitate the development of the competencies required for success at the strategic level.
Army Strategic Leader Competency Development: Small Changes For A Large Impact
Our military has been in constant conflict for over 10 years and by most accounts has performed well at the tactical and operational levels. Understandably, our Army has been focused on the short-term mission of winning the current fight. While many of the lessons learned in Iraq and Afghanistan can be applied in the future development of Army leaders, the Army still has not solved the problem of developing strategic leaders for the future. Following the withdrawal of U.S. Forces from Iraq, with the impending withdrawal of forces from Afghanistan, and with the certainty of decreasing defense budgets in the future, we face a challenge and an opportunity to improve how we identify, educate and develop the future strategic leaders for our Army.
Leader development is the most important core competency of our Army. 1 Multiple Army Chiefs of Staff have commented on the need to build the bench of strategic leaders for our Army, but this continuous identification of the issue has not solved the problem. Currently, our Army does a good job at developing tactical and operational leaders, as evidenced by our success at those levels in Iraq and
Afghanistan, but numerous studies conducted by the Army and by leading think tanks highlight the need for greater attention to strategic leader development. 2 This raises some questions. What key competencies will our future strategic leaders need? How can the Army better develop these key competencies to better prepare officers to become strategic leaders?
To answer these questions, this paper will first identify the competencies required for success at the strategic level. Second, this paper will look at the current Army officer development and progression program, and will then consider recent reviews of the 2 topic that might highlight areas for improvement. Finally, proposed recommendations for change will be presented.
Key Strategic Leader Competencies
A strategic leader is a leader who sees his or her organization as interdependent and interconnected and understands the impacts of his or her decisions inside and outside the organization. Strategic leaders are future focused, they are able to integrate short-term results and long-term focus, and they are drivers of change. 3 Strategic leaders may serve inside or outside the Army, and they must thoroughly understand political-military relationships. 4 America's complex national security environment requires strategic leaders to have an in-depth knowledge of all elements of national power; diplomatic, informational, military, and economic, and they must also understand the interrelationships between these instruments and use them effectively to achieve our strategic ends.
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Competencies are the knowledge, skills, attributes, and capacities that enable a leader to perform his required tasks; they can be developed and improved through education and experience. 6 Different skills are required for success at the strategic level. Although necessary, effective tactical and operational level leadership is not a sufficient condition for leadership success at the strategic level. 7 Although many of the leadership competencies carry over, envisioning the future by developing a vision for the next 5-20 years, consensus building, and communication skills are the most important competencies that would enable a strategic leader to align his or her organization to a constantly changing and complex environment.
The capability to formulate and articulate strategic aims and key concepts is perhaps a strategic leader's most significant capacity. 8 A strategic leader accomplishes 3 this by developing and promulgating an effective vision. Vision refers to a picture of the future with some implicit or explicit commentary on why people should strive to create that future. 9 In other words, vision provides the purpose, direction, and motivation for an organization.
Although leaders at all levels can and many should create a vision, it is essential at the strategic level. At all levels, a vision is focused on where the leader wants to take the organization. Unlike lower levels where the leader has the ability to directly influence his or her subordinates, at the strategic level, the leader is dependent on subordinates to do the influencing. An effective vision allows this influencing to be more focused and effective toward a common goal.
Prior to producing an effective vision at the strategic level, a leader must thoroughly understand the organization, know the internal and external stakeholders, and understand the internal and external audiences. For the Army, the internal audience is subordinate units or commands, and individual Soldiers and leaders. The external audience includes, but is not limited to, Congress, the American public, allies, and potentially even adversaries. Internal implications of an effective vision could include doctrinal changes, organizational changes, manpower adjustments, training focus, or changes in research and development. Externally, an effective vision allows outside actors and stakeholders to know the desired future direction of the Army.
Although it may be important in some instances at other levels, consensus building is essential at the strategic level. During the 2012-2013 Army Senior Leader
Day at the Army War College (AWC), many of the leaders present described consensus building as the one competency that was essential for success at the strategic level. 10 4 This is more important at the strategic level than other levels because the strategic leader spends more time dealing with outside organizations. The strategic leader may deal with legislatures, other Services, inter-agencies, non-governmental organizations, and even other nations -none of which would respond positively to orders or directives.
Consensus is necessary for coordinated and effective action. 11 In order to reach consensus, the strategic leader, at a minimum, needs to be self-aware, culturally aware, and needs to possess negotiating skills. In order to effectively promulgate a vision and to be an effective consensus builder, a strategic leader needs to possess excellent communication skills. All officers are required to have a bachelor's degree prior to attendance at CCC, but there is no requirement for an advanced degree for the majority of officers. Officers may pursue full-time studies for an advanced degree through either fully funded or partially funded programs, but the number of positions available is based on budget, policy, or Army needs. 20 Cooperative degree programs are available at some branch schools and ILE, and tuition assistance is available for those officers desiring to pursue an advanced degree off-duty. There are also a small number of fellowships that allow an officer to pursue an advanced degree followed by a utilization tour on the Joint or Broadening assignments are supposed to develop a wider range of skills, knowledge, and understanding. 23 For the purpose of this paper, typical assignments for a due course Infantry Officer will be used as career progression for an Infantry Officer is similar to other Maneuver, Fire, and Effects (MFE) Officers, and the majority of General
Officers come for the MFE ranks. Unlike the institutional and operational domains, no time is allocated for selfdevelopment. According to DA PAM 600-3, self-development is a continuous, life-long process that consists of individual study, research, and practice that supplements onthe-job and institutional training and is on-going throughout an officer's career. 26 Selfdevelopment is the responsibility of each individual officer.
The following figure from DA PAM 600-3 visually depicts the concept for officer development over an officer's career. This portion of the paper will discuss the various shortcomings the Army has in developing strategic leaders.
One shortcoming highlighted in multiple Army studies is that personnel management requirements drive operational assignments at the expense of quality developmental experiences. 27 The Defense Officer Professional Management Act (DOPMA) of 1980 contains many of the laws and policies that govern officer career management. DOPMA is a time based management system with relatively fixed promotion zones. 28 The key aspects of DOPMA include promotion zones based on seniority, allowing officers one opportunity per grade to be in the promotion zone, allowing officers above the zone to remain eligible for promotion, and requiring separation of captains and majors who fail selection for promotion twice. It is Department of Defense policy "based on congressional intent conveyed in the House and Senate reports accompanying the DOPMA legislation," that establishes promotion zones. 29 A time-based system means all officers are eligible for promotion at similar time gates, plus or minus a year or two on either side to allow for below or double below the zone and above the zone promotions. Currently, assignments and schools are "linked to promotions and career management models for all officers." 30 From this, it can easily be deduced that the development of an officer is based on promotion timelines. This discourages officers from some broadening assignments that require more time to complete such as the United States Military Academy (USMA) faculty which is a five year total requirement, or some fellowships that are a three year total requirement because of a belief by many that accepting those assignments may put an officer behind his peers, and put him at risk for promotion. 31 Overlaying the various assignment, military education, and promotion timelines produces a view of the officer career progression for an Infantry Officer. Additionally, some assignments classified as broadening do not meet the Army's definition of broadening. An examination of developmental assignments listed in DA PAM 600-3 for captains through lieutenant colonels shows that a majority are focused at the tactical or operational levels. 33 As a result, officer development and career progression are not optimized to develop strategic leader competencies.
Major Studies and Reviews
This section will look at 5 reviews and studies from a variety of sources and focus on the relevant conclusions and recommendations related to officer development. Three of these, The panel conducted a series of interviews and surveys and observed that officers felt that Army practices were out of balance with Army beliefs. 35 Some key conclusions of the panel are as follows. First, excessive operational tempo reduces the quality of training, operational and educational experiences. This increased tempo adversely affects leader development. 36 Second, personnel management requirements drive operational assignments at the expense of quality developmental assignments. 37 Another conclusion was that the Army's most experienced instructors teach the most experienced students (e.g., SSC) while less experienced instructors teach the least experienced students (e.g., BOLC), and there is no Army process to select, assign, train and certify OES instructors. 38 Key recommendations include revising DA PAM 600-3 to focus career management on quality experiences in the institutional and operational domains, and changing the strategy to select and assign OES faculty to ensure the best qualified and most experienced instructors are used throughout. 39 The 2010 Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey of Army Leadership (CASAL) survey on Army Education looked at the quality and effectiveness of professional military education (PME) in leadership development. The study showed that PME ratings continue to receive less than 66% favorable ratings for improving leadership capabilities, preparing graduates to develop subordinates, and preparing graduates for their next assignments. 40 The favorability percentages increased as the experience of the student and the experience of the instructor increased. 41 In other words, ILE and AWC graduates had a much higher favorability rating than BOLC and 14 CCC. Another finding was that favorability percentages increased from previous years' studies, but army education needs to continue to be an interest and concern for Senior Army leaders. 42 The main recommendation is that the Army needs to decide where students learn and develop necessary competencies and develop standards for success. 43 The 2011 CASAL survey on Army Leadership is based on responses from over 16,800 Army leaders. A major finding was the "develops others" competency continues to be the lowest rated core leadership competency across all levels. 44 Another finding is that rapid promotion and "rigid methods for development and advancement" have a negative influence on leader development. 45 The time based promotion system has prevented leaders from remaining in positions long enough to develop the skills necessary for future leadership roles. Additionally, current leaders who have had limited duty positions lack the skills necessary for command and staff positions. A recommendation is to adopt a more flexible personnel management system that meets the needs of the Army and fosters better leader development. 46 The Strategic Studies Institute paper on developing talent is the fifth of six monographs focused on talent management in the Army. The purpose of the monograph is to provide a way to tailor talent development based on an officer's unique talents, skills, experiences, and needs. 47 51 Senior leaders often find themselves in jobs where they haven't received the formal education needed to succeed. 52 The monograph recommends adopting a continuing education program to include more graduate school and executive level educational opportunities, changing the OER blocking percentages to fit Army and unit needs, and a continuous evaluation of the signals the Army values to ensure to officers are developing the talents it needs for the future.
In Keeping the Edge: Revitalizing America's Officer Corps, the authors state that the Army must develop and maintain a high degree of adaptability in its officer corps in order to be effective in an increasingly complex environment. 53 In addition to proficiency in conventional warfare tasks, officers must also develop "a broader knowledge of politics, economics, and the use of information" to be successful in a more complex and rapidly changing environment. 54 The paper makes some recommendations worth 16 serious consideration. First, the paper recommends allowing officers career flexibility in the form of unconventional assignments and sabbaticals. Sabbaticals could be used to deal with family or personal issues, pursue graduate education, or to gain additional experiences beneficial to their military careers, such as working with industry. 55 The paper also recommends enhancing officer education by getting career officers outside of their comfort zones and into the academic arena by increasing graduate degree opportunities, and continuing officer education into the General and Flag Officer ranks. 56 Other recommendations include increasing Joint, Interagency, Intergovernmental, and Multinational (JIIM) opportunities, and making those opportunities available earlier in an officer's career. Increased training in communication skills and cultivating linguistic and cultural knowledge throughout an officer's career are also recommended. 57 The final recommendation of the paper is probably the most important, promoting the right people with the right skills. In other words, promoting officers with the skills that are most valuable for anticipated future conflict and are most capable of leading the Army in the future, not just those who demonstrate tactical excellence. 58 The review of the studies and papers identified some overarching themes and areas of improvement. First, the current leader development model does not meet the requirements for developing strategic leaders. The Army needs to better manage individual officer development through developmental, broadening, and educational opportunities, and broadening opportunities need to be increased. The Army needs to improve the quality of OES and increase opportunities for civilian graduate education.
Second, the time based career progression model does not effectively meet the requirements of developing strategic leaders. The Army needs to allow more flexibility in career progression, and needs to better incentivize broadening opportunities.
Recommendations
This portion of the paper will recommend changes to improve the development of strategic leaders for our Army. The recommendations will include identification of talented officers, changes to officer career progression, and changes to the operational and institutional domains.
Not all officers will become strategic leaders, nor do all officers desire to become strategic leaders. The Army needs to identify those with the potential and desire and maximize their opportunities to develop the competencies required for success at the strategic level. One way to identify officers with potential is thru the Officer Evaluation Report (OER). The current OER, Department of the Army (DA) Form 67-9, allows senior raters to give an "above center of mass" rating to up to 49 percent of the officers in their rating pool. The other 51 percent of officers may receive "center of mass" or "below center of mass" ratings. A 49 percent rating is too broad for identifying future strategic leaders, and takes identifying future leaders, and identifying those who need to receive priority for key broadening assignments away from raters and senior raters and passes that responsibility to Human Resources Command (HRC) Assignment Officers and members of DA selection boards. 59 The Army has already made adjustments to the OER that will be effective in 2013, but the changes don't go far enough. Requiring the rater to use enumeration is a vast improvement and ensures that the rater has a voice in which officers show the greatest potential for promotion and key assignments, but there still in not enough stratification in the senior rater portion. Having blocks for the top 10%, 11-33%, 34-49%, 50-80%, and 81-100% allows senior raters to have greater input on who gets promoted, allows assignment officers to better discern who has the potential to excel at various developmental and broadening assignments, and paints a better picture of manner of performance for selection boards. 60 Once officers with an exceptional pattern of performance are identified, they need to be personally managed by the branch representatives at Human Resources Command to ensure they are afforded the opportunity to develop the competencies discussed earlier that are required at the strategic level.
The Army identifies broadening assignments as those assignments that "develop a wider range of knowledge and skills, augment understanding of the full spectrum of Earning an advanced degree benefits the Army, regardless of the field of study.
Critical and creative thinking skills are developed, officers are exposed to different points of view and cultures, and officers gain the knowledge of the field of study. Getting career officers out of their comfort zones and into an academic arena where their view of the world is challenged can only benefit the Army. 62 The Army currently has no Ph.D. In the current Army promotion system, officers are eligible for promotion based on their time in grade. This system keeps some officers from applying for and accepting broadening assignments because of the perception that they will end up behind their peers. Adopting a promotion system that allows an officer to be in the promotion zone for up to 3 years for the major, lieutenant colonel, and colonel boards would allow officers to complete required and desired broadening opportunities, and would allow officers the opportunity to remain in some KD positions longer than the current 18-24 month limit. This would ensure that officers selected for colonel have had the time to complete the experiences and education necessary to develop the competencies required for success at the strategic levels. Doing this would ensure that officers selected to serve at the strategic level have had the opportunity to develop the competencies required for success at that level.
Quality of OES active duty instructors continues to be an issue. 64 OES instructors are not chosen from the top tier of officers. With the exception of MCCC, which is a nominative assignment, officers assigned as OES instructors are Tier 2 officers. In other words, they are fully qualified but not necessarily the best a branch has to offer. 65 A recent study of CCC graduates found that course satisfaction correlated with branch investment in selecting, certifying, and developing instructors. 66 The Army needs to invest in the future by ensuring its officers are trained and educated by the best officers.
The Army needs to assign some former battalion or brigade level commanders as OES instructors, and provide a promotion incentive for those officers who choose to be an OES instructor through instructions to promotion board members.
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Conclusion
This paper looked at how the Army could better develop strategic leaders by first identifying what competencies are needed for success at the strategic level; developing a vision, consensus building, and communications. Next, the paper looked at the current officer development and progression system and identified that the system focuses on tactical and operational competencies at the expense of developing strategic competencies.
The paper then reviewed some studies and surveys that showed the current system does not effectively develop strategic leader competencies due to the time based promotion system, inadequate access to advanced civilian education, and the failure to properly define and incentivize broadening assignments.
The Army currently does a good job at developing leaders to fight and win at the tactical and operational levels, but it must provide the opportunity and incentive for those with the desire and the potential to develop the competencies required for success at the strategic level. Requiring officers identified as having the potential to succeed at the strategic level to complete graduate level education and serve in multiple broadening assignments will set the conditions for the development of the competencies required for success at the strategic level. The Army needs to invest in its education system by assigning quality officers to train and educate its future leaders, and by increasing the communication requirements of officers to communicate to non-military audiences.
The promotion system needs to be changed to allow for more flexibility in an officer's career to allow time for broadening and educational opportunities, and the Army needs to signal that it values broadening and advanced education through promotions.
